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1. THE COLLAGE OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
The world of shareholder activism has expanded dramatically
over the past twenty years so that it now contains a broad set of actors
carrying on a wide range of activities. At one end of the spectrum,
John Beasley Professor of Law and Business, Vanderbilt School of Law, Vanderbilt
University. My thanks to Professors James D. Cox, Alan Palmiter and Robert B. Thompson for
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hedge fund activist shareholders have taken large investment
positions in targeted companies and spent significant amounts of
money lobbying aggressively for a host of structural changes at these
corporations. At a more intermediate level of activism are the labor
union pension funds. The union funds have been active, making
innovative uses of the federal securities laws to get shareholder
proposals on corporate ballots and trying out a host of other
techniques aimed at improving corporate governance systems at
public companies. Union funds are willing to spend some money on
corporate governance initiatives, but, unlike hedge funds, do not
generally accumulate large percentage stock positions in targeted
firms. At the low end on the activist scale are the public pension
funds. Once touted as the potential champion for investors, public
pension funds today are largely just supporting players, frequently
falling in behind the activist hedge funds and labor union pension
funds. Public pension funds rarely step forward with their own
initiatives except for low cost activism efforts, such as "withhold the
vote" campaigns. Only in securities fraud class actions have public
pension funds taken the lead, apparently responding to a
Congressional invitation to act as lead plaintiffs in these cases.
In an important paper recently appearing in the Vanderbilt
Law Review, Professors Stephen Choi and Jill Fisch generate survey
evidence from public pension fund respondents that documents the
low cost activism practiced by public pension funds.1 The results of
their survey show, among other things, that public pension funds do a
limited amount of non-litigation oriented activism mostly centered on
supporting other types of activist investors. For example, these funds
follow advice from their proxy voting advisors in withhold the vote
campaigns or similar low cost voting initiatives. Furthermore, larger
public funds demonstrate higher levels of non-litigation forms of
activism than smaller sized public funds. However, the survey
responses show that many public funds act as lead plaintiffs in
securities fraud class actions and that the level of participation in
litigation-oriented activism does not appear to vary by fund size.
These are important and very interesting results that shed
light on a number of key issues but also raise a number of important
questions about shareholder activism and the SEC's regulatory
approach to it. For that reason, it is important to examine critically
the survey evidence provided as well as the authors' interpretation of
their results.
1. Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the
Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315 (2008).
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II. THE SURVEY AND ITS RESULTS
A. Design
First, it is important to note the data limitations of the study.
Choi and Fisch sent surveys to 124 funds out of the universe of 2656
public pension funds. Only forty pension funds responded to the non-
litigation activism portion of the survey, while twenty-four funds
responded to the litigation portion.2 The project design raises a
number of questions: Are the 124 funds that were sent the survey
representative of the universe of public pension funds? Is it fair to
draw strong conclusions from a sample containing one and one-half
percent of the total population? Should we be worried about the fact
that only one-third (or in the case of the litigation portion of the
survey one-fifth) of those institutions surveyed responded? Are these
representative funds, or is there likely to be a response bias? While
the authors do discuss some of these questions briefly, 3 it is important
to be cautious in the interpretation of their results because of these
issues.
B. Voting Results
One of the important findings from the survey is that public
pension funds delegate voting authority for much of their portfolios
either to outside managers or to third party proxy advisors, such as
RiskMetrics.' While the authors appear concerned that this delegation
will lead to increased agency costs, two points bear noting. First, when
the delegation is to outside managers, those managers are evaluated
on the returns generated by their investments and will therefore have
the correct incentives to vote these shares to maximize each
corporation's value, even if they may be otherwise loath to spend
money on initiating other activism. Second, delegating voting
decisions to RiskMetrics may lead to more successful activist efforts
2. Id. at 325 tbl. 1(b).
3. The authors note that the size of assets under management are not significantly
different between the respondents and non-respondents in the survey, id. at 322, but this does
not tell us anything about their representativeness with respect to the remainder of the public
pension fund universe.
4. RiskMetrics acquired Institutional Shareholder Services ("ISS") in 2007. RiskMetrics
Group, RiskMetrics Group History, http://www.riskmetrics.com/about/history.html. It is
important to note that voting delegations will also be reviewed by the fund managers and can be
withdrawn at any time, especially if there is an extraordinary corporate transaction being put to
a vote.
2008] 3
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because RiskMetrics can help to solve the collective action problem
that institutions face when trying to mount effective voting
campaigns.
A second interesting piece of evidence from the survey is that a
significant percentage of public pension funds appear to let a proxy
advisor develop their voting policies. The authors are again worried
that this delegation may create agency costs. I view this as a
specialization story.5 There is little reason to reinvent the wheel on
voting on most routine corporate and shareholder proposals, so why
not just fine tune an existing policy to meet a public fund's needs? In
the event of an extraordinary transaction-which is certainly the most
important class of voting decisions for funds-the pension funds'
trustees, or other internal personnel, will need to make a
determination if the transaction is in the fund's best interests, no
matter what the fund's policy says.
One area that could be explored in future research on public
pension funds' voting practices is how they compare with mutual fund
practices. We would benefit from public disclosure of how public
pension funds vote their shares. With the recent public availability of
data about mutual fund voting, there has been a flurry of research on
their voting behavior and support for corporate governance changes.
For example, larger mutual funds tend to vote all of their shares as a
block in favor of management except on antitakeover and executive
compensation issues.6 It would be interesting to know if public pension
funds show similar tendencies.
Finally, Choi & Fisch note that their survey results show that
public pension funds are not major sponsors of shareholder proposals
today.7 This absence of activism has been true for many years, as
individuals and labor unions have been the main sponsors of these
proposals since the early 1990s if not before. However, public pension
5. Similarly, the benefits of specialization may explain why funds outsource their claims
management practice in securities class actions and other litigation. It seems possible that a
properly incentivized bank will be more efficient than a public pension fund in filing claims in
these cases, making delegation to this outsider efficient.
6. Burton G. Rothberg & Steven B. Lilien, Mutual Fund Proxy Votes, (Working Paper
Series, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=669161.
7. Recent research suggests that shareholder proposals have positive stock price impacts
on targeted firms. See Luc Renneboog & Peter G. Szilagyi, The Success and Relevance of
Shareholder Activism Through Proxy Proposals (European Corporate Governance Inst. Working
Paper Series, 2008), available at
http://www.ecgi.org/competitions/rof/files/Renneboog,%/ 20Szilagyi%/ 20-
%20Shareholder%20activismECGI-bestpapercompetition.pdf. Shareholder proposals may also
lead to significant reductions in targeted firms' antitakeover defenses. Randall S. Thomas &
James F. Cotter, Shareholder Proposals in the New Millennium: Shareholder Support, Board
Response and Market Reaction, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 368 (2007).
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funds do support the efforts of more active investors in a variety of
ways. For example, hedge funds are more likely to target firms with
higher levels of institutional stock ownership.8
C. Legal and Cost Barriers
Two of the major barriers to public pension fund non-litigation
activism are high costs and legal rules. With respect to the latter,
Professor Bernard Black noted several years ago that the federal
securities laws penalize any institution that successfully nominates a
candidate to a corporate board of directors by restricting their ability
to trade in the company's stock.9 Not surprisingly, the survey evidence
compiled by Choi and Fisch shows that public pension funds do not
nominate director candidates. What is perhaps surprising is that
Congress and the SEC have done nothing to alter these rules almost
twenty years after Black first pointed this problem out.
Black also predicted that public pension funds would largely
engage in low cost forms of activism. Costs undoubtedly explain why
public pension funds do not generally solicit proxies from other
shareholders. Doing a solicitation remains an expensive proposition,
as is active participation in a proxy fight. While these costs are
dropping, public pension funds are undoubtedly happy to leave this
task to the labor union pension funds and hedge funds. This is again
consistent with the results of the survey.
Choi and Fisch argue that bigger institutions may also be more
active because they can afford to bear higher costs in their larger
administrative budgets. 10 However, there is another equally plausible
interpretation of these results: bigger funds will generally hold larger
positions in the firms they target for activism, will have more
influence with corporate management at those firms, and therefore
will be more likely to succeed in their activism. Since they are more
likely to succeed, bigger firms should be more likely to be active in the
8. Alon Bray et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Performance, and Firm Performance,
58 J. FIN. 1729 (2008).
9. Bernard Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990).
10. Choi and Fisch also analyze the effect on non-litigation activism of the presence of an
appointed or elected public official as the decisionmaker discussion at the fund. Choi & Fisch,
surpa note 1, at 345-46. Using a sample of four observations, they find at a ten percent
significance level that this is correlated with higher levels of non-litigation activism. Id. at 344
n.45 (only ten percent of forty observations have public decisionmakers). While potentially
interesting, the very small number of observations would seem to merit a more detailed
discussion of the characteristics of these four funds before drawing strong conclusions.
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non-litigation areas." Under either theory though, institutional
activism seems to respond appropriately to cost-benefit calculations.
D. Litigation
Securities fraud class action settlements generate money for
public pension funds, about $6.75 million a year on average per fund
according to the survey respondents. Choi and Fisch claim that this is
a trivial fraction of these funds' total assets. But is that really the
appropriate metric? For example, it would be interesting to know what
percentage of these funds' annual operating budgets is covered by
their recoveries. For many funds, $6.75 million would undoubtedly
cover most of their overhead, making it well worth their while to
continue pursuing these cases, especially if their participation as lead
plaintiffs results in higher recoveries. 12 Moreover, these payments
recur on an annual basis. If we think of these payments as continuing
into the indefinite future-that is, as annuities-then their present
value is equal to $135 million on average for each public pension
fund. 13 Given the low costs of filing claims, this seems like a
significant gain to the funds.
One of the most interesting findings from the survey is that
public pension funds, irrespective of their size, actively participate as
lead plaintiffs in securities fraud class actions. Choi and Fisch offer
11. As I discuss below, fund size may not be correlated with success in litigation activism.
12. Although a number of studies have found correlations between higher settlements and
the presence of a public pension fund as a lead plaintiff in a securities class action, Choi and
Fisch argue that there may be no causal linkage because institutions may just be "cherry
picking" the best cases. Choi & Fisch, surpa note 1, at 341. They cite to one of their previous
articles in which they found that institutional participation raised settlement values, but argued
that their analysis had omitted two important explanatory variables, the presence of an
accounting restatement, and an SEC investigation. Id. (citing Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch &
Adam C. Pritchard, Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869, 892 (2005)). More recent papers
by Michael Perino and by Cornerstone Research that include these variables (and a host of other
additional control variables) in their analysis of settlement size, however, find that the presence
of a public pension fund leads to increased settlement size. See Michael Perino, Institutional
Activism Through Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Fund Participation in
Securities Class Actions 23 (St. John's Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-0055, 2006),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract id=938722 (finding results
consistent with the hypothesis that "public pension fund monitoring is effective in enhancing
class recoveries"; LAURA E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. RYAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2007 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 10, 16 (2007), available at
http://securities.stanford.edu/Settlements/REVIEW_1995-
2007/SettlementsThrough_12_2007.pdf (finding that "public pension fund monitoring is
effective in enhancing class recoveries," and listing the control variables used to arrive at that
conclusion). This would seem to resolve the issue in favor of finding a causal relationship.
13. This assumes a discount rate of five percent and an indefinite stream of payments.
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several explanations why they believe that fund size is not a
determinant of participation, but I want to add another one: unlike
with non-litigation activism, where the larger size of the fund's
holdings in the targeted firm may make it more likely to succeed, in
litigation, the size of the fund's holdings may not have any effect on its
success. In other words, it may make little difference to the size of a
recovery in litigation how much stock an institutional lead plaintiff
holds.14 If this is true, then we should expect all funds to be willing to
serve in this capacity in order to increase their recoveries, especially
because the PSLRA limits the number of cases in which any lead
plaintiff can appear.
Finally, the survey data show that public pension funds are
largely inactive in pursuing some other types of litigation, such as
appraisal or derivative actions. This is hardly surprising for several
reasons. First, appraisal is widely viewed as an expensive, ineffective
remedy for shareholders. Few appraisal cases are filed and even fewer
are actively pursued by any shareholders. Second, derivative litigation
suffers from high procedural barriers, such as the demand
requirement and the use of special litigation committees, plus
relatively low recoveries in comparison to securities fraud class
actions. Furthermore, there is no lead plaintiff provision for derivative
suits that would help ensure that public pension funds would be more
likely to be selected as class representatives. Moreover, as Choi and
Fisch note, it may be important to public pension funds to have the
legislative stamp of approval before they choose to appear as lead
plaintiffs in derivative cases, something that the States have yet to do.
III. CONCLUSION
Choi and Fisch's survey evidence gives us some tantalizing
glimpses inside the black box of public pension fund activism. At the
end of the day though, we are still left with lots of big questions. Do
we need more activism? Are public pension funds doing the optimal
amount already given the level of hedge fund and labor union pension
fund activism? If those investors are already generating plenty of
pressure for corporate boards to take investor interests seriously,
maybe it is a good thing that public pension funds are not firebrands.
Certainly from the perspective of their beneficiaries, it is cheaper for
public pension funds to free ride on the efforts of the other activists.
14. It is undoubtedly true that, as between two potential lead plaintiffs, a court is more
likely to choose the one with the larger holdings. But to date there is no evidence that having a
bigger public pension fund as a plaintiff results in a bigger recovery for investors.
2008] 7
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The SEC's deregulatory initiatives of the early 1990s that freed
up the shareholder voting process opened the door for hedge funds and
labor union pension funds to become more effective shareholder
activists. As Choi and Fisch note, they also opened the door for public
pension funds to do the same thing, but unlike their brethren,
American public pension funds chose not to do so. This leaves us to
wonder whether it would have been more efficient if American public
funds had taken a different road and instead followed the path of the
Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan ("OTPP") in imitating hedge fund
shareholder activism. 15 The OTPP has shown that public pension
funds can be highly activist institutions when they choose to do so. We
should be reluctant therefore to jump to the conclusion that public
pension funds in the United States will always select low cost activist
strategies regardless of legal barriers and financial constraints.
15. For example, the OTPP financed the largest corporate takeover in Canadian history
when it acquired BCE Inc. Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan Wins Battle for BCE, CBCNEWS.CA,
June 30, 2007, available at http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/06/30/bce-teachers.html?ref-rss.
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